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DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS OF TRANSLATES
BY
E. HERNÁNDEZ∗, M. NIELSEN, H. ŠIKIĆ∗∗ AND F. SORIA∗
Abstract. Democratic systems arise in the context of greedy ap-
proximations in Banach spaces. Systems of translates of a single
function are the basis of shift invariant subspaces and are used in
the construction of wavelets and Gabor systems. In this article we
study the democracy in L2(R) of the system of integer translates
of a single function ψ ∈ L2(R). Necessary and sufficient criteria
are given in terms of properties of ψ. The problem of finding an
(operative) necessary and sufficient condition is still unsolved.
§1. Introduction
Democratic systems arise in the context of greedy approximations in
Banach spaces. The greedy algorithm is an important method in nu-
merical mathematics; for more details see the early work of V. N. Tem-
lyakov [17], [18]. At the same time it also points to some interesting
issues in functional analysis. In particular, we would like to emphasize
the basic theorem of S. V. Konyagin and V. N. Temlyakov (see [8])
which states that a basis in a Banach space is greedy if and only if it
is unconditional and democratic. Hence, one could expect (and this is
indeed so) that there are democratic bases which are not unconditional.
It is important to mention that it is often difficult to produce valuable
examples of conditional bases (it is good to consult books by I. Singer
[16], J. Lindenstrauss and L. Tzafriri [9], R. Young [19]; numerous no-
tions and fundamental results that we use here one can find there).
We find an interesting direction in an article by P. Wojtaszczyk [20]
where even more general systems than bases are studied in a similar
context. The author studies quasi-greedy biorthogonal systems and de-
velops a method to construct a wide range of quasi-greedy conditional
bases. This partially motivates our work, since we shall also study that
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democratic property for general systems and we shall also try to offer
deeper understanding of a particular, but fairly rich class of conditional
democratic bases.
Let us comment on the second notion in our title. Systems of trans-
lates are recently again studied thoroughly, from the point of view
of various reproducing function systems, like wavelets, Gabor systems,
etc. Very often are the most basic properties of such systems character-
ized in terms of some associated system of (integer or other) translates
of a function (or functions); see Ch. Heil and A. Powell [3], as well as
[4], [15] and the references therein. In particular, there is a hierarchy of
simple and usable conditions that characterize various basis-like pro-
perties of a system of integer translates of a square integrable function
(see [5] and, for some far reaching generalizations, [6]).
The simplicity of such characterizations allows systematic construc-
tion of (perhaps surprisingly) rich families of examples (including also
the case of a conditional basis); see [14] for one such method in the
case of wavelets.
There is a natural question to be answered. Consider a system of
integer translations of a single square integrable function on the real
line. What are necessary and sufficient conditions for such a system
to be democratic? Let us emphasize immediately two features of this
question. First of all, the question is not a simple one; even in this,
most elementary example among various systems of translates. As we
shall see, in one important subcase, when our system forms a Parseval
frame, the question is most closely related to the L2-norm concentration
(see [1] and [2] for recent developments and for basic literature on the
subject). As a consequence, at this point we are not able to fully
answer our main question, i.e., to offer a characterization of a system
of translates that is given in simple terms which are not difficult to
check. Still, we offer several necessary criteria and several sufficient
criteria that meet such standards, and in some subclasses, like in the
continuous case, we provide very elegant characterizations.
The second feature we would like to emphasize, connects nicely to
the issue of conditional Schauder bases, mentioned earlier. We already
know that such systems of translates form a Schauder basis if and only
if the periodization of the Fourier transform of the generating function
satisfies the celebrated Muckenhoupt Ap condition (see [11] and [10] for
details). We also know (recall the result of P. Wojtaszczyk) that such
systems of translates can not form conditional, quasi-greedy, Schauder
bases; see [12]. Hence, the only chance to have conditional Schauder
basis of translates with some properties akin to “greediness” is within
the realm of democratic, conditional Schauder bases. As we shall see,
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS OF TRANSLATES 3
even in the case of system of translates this class is very rich and
exhibits some interesting properties.
We explain some basic details about democratic systems in Section 2.
In Section 3 we offer a quick overview of various known properties of
systems of translates. In Section 4 we develop our theory of democratic
systems of integer translates of a single square integrable function on
the real line.
§2. Democratic families. Basic properties
We shall work eventually within a particular Hilbert space. However,
most properties of democratic families can be formulated in a much
more general space. We take the middle ground here, which is easily
understandable to a mathematician of any background.
Consider a normed space (X, ‖ ‖). For a finite and non-empty family
G ⊆ X\{0} we introduce the notation
∑
G
:=
∥∥∥
∑
x∈G
x
‖x‖
∥∥∥ . (2.1)
It is straightforward to check the following properties. If card(G) = 1,
then
∑
G = 1. In general, 0 6
∑
G 6 card(G). Already with two
vectors one can combine
∑
G to achieve any value in [0, card(G)]. For
example, G = {−x, x} gives ∑G = 0, while G = {x, 2x} gives
∑
G = 2.
Obviously, if
∑
G = 0, then G is linearly dependent. The reverse,
however, is not necessarily true. If {G1,G2} is a non-trivial partition of
G, then the triangle inequality gives
∑
G1
−
∑
G2
6
∑
G
6
∑
G1
+
∑
G2
; (2.2)
in particular, if g ∈ G and card(G) > 2, then
∑
G\{g}
−1 6
∑
G
6
∑
G\{g}
+1 . (2.3)
Given ∅ 6= F ⊆ X\{0} and n ∈ N such that n 6 cardF , we define
D+(n ;F) := sup
G⊆F
card(G)=n
∑
G
D−(n ;F) := infG⊆F
card(G)=n
∑
G
.
(2.4)
It follows from previous observations that D−(1 ;F) = D+(1 ;F) = 1
and
0 6 D−(n ;F) 6 D+(n ;F) 6 n .
Furthermore, if k, ` ∈ N are such that k + ` = n, then
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D−(k ;F)−D+(` ;F) 6 D−(n ;F) 6
6D+(n ;F) 6 D+(k ;F) +D+(` ;F) . (2.5)
Let us explore some extremal cases first. We have seen already that
D−(n ;F) = 0 is possible. What about D+(n ;F) = 0 ? The following
examples and the following lemma describe such a possibility more or
less completely.
Example 2.6. (a) Let F = {−x, x} for some x ∈ X\{0}. Then
D−(1 ;F) = D+(1 ;F) = 1 and D−(2 ;F) = D+(2 ;F) = 0.
(b) Let X = R3. Take x1 = (1, 0, 0) and find x2 so that ‖x2‖ = 1
and ‖x1 + x2‖ = 1; for example x2 = (−12 ,
√
3
2
, 0) satisfies these proper-
ties. Take F = {x1, x2,−(x1 + x2)}. Then D−(1 ;F) = D+(1 ;F) =
D−(2 ;F) = D+(2 ;F) = 1 and D−(3 ;F) = D+(3 ;F) = 0
(c) The nth-roots of unity (i.e., F = {exp(2πik
n
) ; k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1} in
(C, | |)) give us simple examples of the phenomenon illustrated in (a)
and (b). Observe D−(n − 1;F) = D+(n − 1;F) = 1 and D−(n ;F) =
D+(n ;F) = 0.
(d) Observe that in general for a finite F we have
D−(card(F);F) = D+(card(F);F) =
∑
F
(2.7)
Observe also that for n < card(F) it is possible to have D−(n ;F) =
0; take, for example, F = {x,−x, 2x}. Compare this with the following
result.

Lemma 2.8. If n < card(F), then D+(n ;F) > 0.
Proof. For n = 1 the statement is always true. Consider n ∈ N \ {1}.
Since n < card(F) we can find n−1 mutually distinct vectors in F . Let
us fix some choice of such vectors x1, . . . , xn−1 ∈ F . Since n < card(F),
we can find two vectors y1, y2 ∈ F \ {x1, . . . , xn−1} such that y1 6= y2.
Suppose now, to the contrary, that D+(n ;F) = 0. Then it would
follow ∑
{x1,...,xn−1,y1}
=
∑
{x1,...,xn−1,y2}
= 0 ,
which implies y1‖y1‖ =
y2
‖y2‖ . Take any k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, replace xk
with y1 and keep y2. Then, using 0 =
∑
{x1,...,y1,...,xn−1,y2}, we obtain
y1
‖y1‖ =
xk
‖xk‖ . Since k was arbitrary, we proved that
y1
‖y1‖
=
x1
‖x1‖
= · · · = xn−1‖xn−1‖
.
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Hence, using 0 =
∑
{x1,...,xn−1,y1}, we obtain n·
y1
‖y1‖ = 0; which is not
possible, since y1 ∈ F ⊆ X \ {0}.
Q.E.D.
Let us now define the main notion of this article.
Definition 2.9. A non-empty family F ⊆ X \ {0} is democratic if
there exists D > 0 such that
(
G, H ⊆ F , G and H finite, card(G) = card(H)⇒
∑
G
6 D
∑
H
)
.
Using Lm. 2.8 we immediately obtain the following:
(
n < card(F), D−(n ;F) = 0 ⇒ F is not democratic
)
. (2.10)
Obviously, if n = card(G) = card(H) in Def. 2.9, then D−(n ;F) 6
min{∑G,
∑
H} 6 max{
∑
G,
∑
H} 6 D+(n ;F) and both bounds can
be approximated with min{∑G,
∑
H} and max{
∑
G,
∑
H} arbitrarily
close. Using (2.7) and
∑
{x} = 1 we obtain the following straightfor-
ward equivalence:
∅ 6= F ⊆ X \ {0} is democratic
⇔ sup
{
D+(n ;F)
D−(n ;F)
: 2 6 n < card(F)
}
< +∞ . (2.11)
In particular, if card(F) ∈ {1, 2}, then F is always democratic. Fur-
thermore, for democratic systems the smallest constant that satisfies
the defining relationship is exactly the supremum taken in (2.11). In
particular, if D satisfies Def. 2.9 for some system F , then D > 1.
In this article we shall be interested only in countable families. Let
us first describe the case of finite F , which, as we shall see, will not be
otherwise of a particular interest to us. In this case we only have finitely
many subfamilies, so Lm. 2.8 and (2.11) easily imply the following
characterization.
Proposition 2.12. A non-empty and finite family F ⊆ X \ {0} is
democratic if and only if
D−(n ;F) > 0 ,
for every n ∈ {1, . . . , card(F)−1} . If this is the case then we can take
D in Def. 2.9 to be
D = max
16n<card(F)
D+(n ;F)
D−(n ;F)
(with an obvious interpretation for card(F) = 1).
Since for a finite F we can have min instead of inf in the definition
of D− (see (2.4)), we obtain the following result.
6 E. HERNÁNDEZ, M. NIELSEN, H. ŠIKIĆ AND F. SORIA
Corollary 2.13. If ∅ 6= F ⊆ X is finite and linearly independent,
then F is democratic.
Observe that in Ex. 2.6 (a) and (b) we have examples of finite demo-
cratic families which are not linearly independent.
Let us now turn our attention to the most interesting case for us, the
case of infinite and countable family F , i.e., the case when F ⊆ X \{0}
and card(F) = ℵ0. Obviously (see (2.11)) such a family is democratic
if and only if
D(F) := sup
{
D+(n ;F)
D−(n ;F)
: n ∈ N
}
(2.14)
is finite (observe that in general D(F) ∈ [1,+∞]).
This tells us that for democratic families F we can take any sequence
(Gn : n ∈ N) of subfamilies Gn ⊆ F , with card(G) = n, for every n ∈ N,
and we will have
(
H ⊆ F , card(H) = n ⇒ 1
D(F)
∑
Gn
6
∑
H
6 D(F)
∑
Gn
)
.
(2.15)
Hence, in analyzing infinite and countable democratic families we are
primarily interested in “the order of growth” of
∑
Fn , with respect to
n, where Fn ⊆ F , card(Fn) = n.
Example 2.16. Consider X = H, where H is a Hilbert space.
(a) If {ek : k ∈ N} ⊆ H is a Riesz basis with constants 0 < A 6 B <
+∞ (see [7] or [19] for definitions and basic properties), then
A
B
card(G) = A
∑
ek∈G
1
B
6
∥∥∥
∑
ek∈G
ek
‖ek‖
∥∥∥
2
6
6 B
∑
ek∈G
1
A
=
B
A
card(G) ,
for every finite G ⊆ {ek : k ∈ N}. Hence, F = {ek : k ∈ N} is demo-
cratic, and
√
A
B
· √n 6 D−(n ;F) 6 D+(n ;F) 6
√
B
A
· √n . (2.17)
In particular, if F is an orthonormal basis, then A = B = 1 and
D−(n ;F) = D+(n ;F) =
√
n (2.18)
Hence, the most typical behavior that we can expect is that “the order
of growth” of
∑
Fn is
√
n.

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As we shall see, our translation systems are going to exhibit this
same “rate of growth”. Therefore, we shall not go deeper into the study
of abstract democratic systems, despite the fact that there are some
interesting results there. As an illustration, let us at the end of this
section provide some academic examples which show that neither linear
independence nor “the rate of growth” of
√
n are necessary features of
democratic systems in general.
Example 2.19. Take x 6= 0 and consider F = {n · x : n ∈ N}. Then,
D−(n ;F) = D+(n ;F) = n, F is democratic and D(F) = 1. Observe
that F is “highly” linearly dependent.

Example 2.20. Take an orthonormal basis {ek : k ∈ N} in a Hilbert
space H. Take a vector x 6= 0 with the property that (−n) x‖x‖ is not
equal to any
∑
ek∈G
ek, with G ⊆ {ek} being finite. For example, x = e1−e2
has such a property. Let
F := {nx : n ∈ N} ∪ {ek : k ∈ N} .
Then F contains a democratic system (with “growth” √n) and
D−(n ;F) > 0 , ∀n ∈ N .
However, the system F is not democratic, since
D−(n ;F) 6
√
n =
∑
Gn
6
∑
Hn
= n = D+(n ;F) ;
where Gn = {e1, . . . , en} and Hn = {x, 2x, . . . , nx}.

§3. Systems of Translates. Basic Properties
In this section we offer a quick review of basic results about systems
of translates we intend to study here. For definitions, proofs and details
we refer to [15], [11], [5].
Let ψ ∈ L2(R) and consider Fψ := {Tkψ : k ∈ Z}, where Tkψ(x) =
ψ(x−k), x ∈ R. It is known that, for every ψ 6= 0, Fψ is linearly inde-
pendent. The system Fψ has interesting properties within the principal
shift invariant space generated by ψ, i.e.,
〈ψ〉 := span(Fψ) .
It turns out that these properties are given in terms of the periodization
function
pψ(ξ) :=
∑
k∈Z
|ψ̂(ξ + k)|2 , ξ ∈ R , (3.1)
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where ψ̂ denotes the Fourier transform of ψ. The following picture
provides the set of all ψ 6= 0, depending on various properties of Fψ
within 〈ψ〉.
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

















5NB
5B eB
eNB
4NB
4B dB
dNB
3NB
3B cB
cNB
2 b
1 a
B := 3B ∪ 4B ∪ 5B ∪ cB ∪ dB ∪ eB
x := xB ∪ xNB x ∈ {3, 4, 5, c, d, e}
Let us provide a legend for the figure. It represents a set of all ψ 6= 0
and its partition into various subclasses based on the properties of Fψ
within 〈ψ〉.
All classes on the left, named by numbers, have the property that
|{ξ : pψ(ξ) = 0}| > 0 , (3.2)
where |A| denotes the Lebesgue measure of A. All classes on the right,
named by letters, have the property
pψ > 0 a.e. (3.3)
In particular, for all these classes, Fψ is `2-linearly independent. See
[16] for many results on various levels of linear independence. Observe
that convergence for such systems is not necessarily unconditional and
for some properties (`2-linear independence, Schauder basis) the order
of vectors matters. In all such situations we assume that Z is ordered
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as {0, 1,−1, 2,−2, . . .}. We just learned recently that an open problem
whether (3.3) characterizes `2-linear independence has been resolved
positively by S. Saliani [13]. For Besselian classes this is known for
some time ([14]), and we shall see in the next section that democratic
systems are always Besselian. Recall that Fψ is a Besselian system if
and only if there exists 0 < B′ < +∞ such that
pψ 6 B′ a.e. (3.4)
In our figure we have that Fψ is a Besselian system if and only if
ψ ∈ B ∪ 1 ∪ 2 ∪ a ∪ b . (3.5)
After describing “vertical” and “diagonal” division in our figure, let
us turn to the “horizontal” one. We start from the bottom.
The lowest part, i.e., the class 5∪ e consists of these ψ 6= 0 for which
1
pψ
· χ{ξ : pψ(ξ)>0}
is not integrable on the torus T := R/Z (observe that pψ is 1-periodic
on R, i.e., can be considered as a function on T). This class is still
not well understood. We know that eB consists of ψ-s such that Fψ
is Besselian, `2-linearly independent, but not minimal (see [16], [19]
for various results on minimal systems), while in the eNB case we have
same properties except Besselian one. In the class 5B we have Besselian
systems which are not `2-linearly independent and do not allow dual
system in the way we shall explain shortly after.
Obviously then, ψ /∈ 5 ∪ e if and only if
1
pψ
· χ{ξ : pψ(ξ)>0} ∈ L1(T) . (3.6)
In this case we define the dual function ψ̃ in L2(R) using
̂̃
ψ(ξ) :=
ψ̂(ξ)
pψ(ξ)
· χ{ξ : pψ(ξ)>0} . (3.7)
It turns out that ψ̃ ∈ 〈ψ〉 (actually 〈ψ̃〉 = 〈ψ〉),
pψ̃ =
1
pψ
χ{pψ>0} , (3.8)
(observe {pψ̃ > 0} = {pψ > 0}) and
〈Tkψ, T`ψ̃〉L2(R) =
∫
T
e2πiξ(`−k)χ{ξ : pψ(ξ)>0} d ξ , (3.9)
where `, k ∈ Z. In particular,
((3.3) and (3.6))⇔ 1
pψ
∈ L1(T) , (3.10)
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and, in this case, Fψ and Fψ̃ form a biorthogonal system (observe that
in (3.9) we then have δ`,k on the right hand side); which is equivalent
to Fψ being minimal (see [16] and [5] for details).
The distinction on the next level is provided by the following cri-
terium. We define that ψ /∈ 5 ∪ e ∪ 4 ∪ d if there exists a constant
0 < C ′ < +∞ such that
[
1
|I|
∫
I
pψ(ξ) d ξ
][
1
|I|
∫
I
1
pψ(ξ)
· χ{ξ : pψ(ξ)>0} d ξ
]
6 C ′ , (3.11)
for all intervals I ⊆ T. At this point it is still open what exactly is
the consequence of the distinction between classes 4 and 3. However,
it is well-known what happens between d and c. More precisely, under
(3.3) the condition (3.11) is equivalent to the celebrated Muckenhoupt
A2 condition. As shown in [11], we have
ψ ∈ a ∪ b ∪ c ⇔ Fψ is a Schauder basis for 〈ψ〉 . (3.12)
Furthermore, if this is the case, then
Fψ̃ is the dual basis. (3.13)
The distinction on the next level is provided by the following cri-
terium. We define that ψ ∈ 1 ∪ a ∪ 2 ∪ b if there exists constant
0 < A′ 6 B′ < +∞ such that
A′ · χ{ξ : pψ>0} 6 pψ 6 B′ · χ{ξ : pψ>0} . (3.14)
Recall that
(3.14) ⇔ Fψ is a frame for 〈ψ〉 . (3.15)
Furthermore, the best constants A′, B′ are exactly equal to frame bo-
unds. Since
B′χ{pψ>0} 6 B′ ,
it is obvious that such systems are always Besselian. As before, when
we add (3.3) we obtain basis type properties. In particular,
ψ ∈ a ∪ b ⇔ Fψ is a Riesz basis for 〈ψ〉 . (3.16)
Observe that class c consists of such ψ for which Fψ is a Schauder
basis, but it is not a Riesz basis, i.e., c consists of ψ-s for which Fψ
is a conditional Schauder basis. In particular, the class cB consists of
conditional Hilbertian Schauder bases (see [16] or [5] for terminology).
The final distinction comes from the request that A′ = B′ = 1.
Hence,
(
ψ ∈ 1 ∪ a ⇔ pψ = χ{pψ>0}
⇔ Fψ is a Parseval frame for 〈ψ〉
)
.
(3.17)
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In particular,(
ψ ∈ a ⇔ pψ ≡ 1 a.e.
⇔ Fψ is an orthonormal basis for 〈ψ〉
)
.
(3.18)
This provides the detailed description of our figure, which describes
the various properties of Fψ within 〈ψ〉. This is also the stage for our
paper and we can now turn our attention to the main question.
§4. Democratic Systems of Integer Translates
Given 0 6= ψ ∈ L2(R), what are necessary and sufficient conditions
for a system Fψ to be democratic? Observe that 〈ψ〉 is a closed linear
space, so we are working within the Hilbert space 〈ψ〉 and our system
Fψ is always linearly independent. Since ‖Tkψ‖2 = ‖ψ‖2 , for all k ∈ Z,
it is enough to study the behavior of
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖2 , Γ ⊆ Z , Γ finite. (4.1)
It is well known (see, for example, [5]) that 〈ψ〉 is isometrically iso-
morphic to L2(T; pψ), the space of square integrable functions on the
torus, with respect to the measure pψ(ξ) dξ. The role of functions Tkψ
is played by the exponentials, so we have
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖2
2
=
1/2∫
−1/2
|
∑
k∈Γ
e−2πikξ|2 pψ(ξ) dξ . (4.2)
It will be convenient for us to abuse somewhat the notation from our
Section 2. For Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite, we introduce the notation
∑
Γ
=
∑
Γ
(ξ) :=
∑
k∈Γ
e−2πikξ , ξ ∈ R .
Obviously,
∑
Γ is a 1-periodic function, so it can be (and will be most
often) considered as a function on T.
Let us first prove that the democratic property for systems Fψ is
equivalent to having “the rate of growth” of
√
n.
Theorem 4.3. Let 0 6= ψ ∈ L2(R). Then Fψ is democratic if and only
if
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖2
2
 card(Γ) , Γ ⊆ Z , Γ finite.
Proof. Suppose first that the given condition is valid, i.e., there exist
constants 0 < D− 6 D+ < +∞, independent of Γ, such that
D−
√
card(Γ) 6 ‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖2 6 D+
√
card(Γ) ,
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for every Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite. In particular, we obtain
‖ψ‖2 ·
√
nD− 6 D−(n ;Fψ) 6 D+(n ;Fψ) 6 ‖ψ‖2 ·
√
nD+ .
It follows that
sup
{
D+(n ;Fψ)
D−(n ;Fψ)
: n ∈ N
}
6 D
+
D−
< +∞ ,
and we conclude that Fψ is democratic.
Suppose now that Fψ is democratic, i.e., 0 < D := D(Fψ) < +∞.
For any Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite, we have
D+
(
card(Γ) ;Fψ
)
D
6 D−(card(Γ) ;Fψ) 6 ‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ
‖ψ‖2
‖2 6
6 D+
(
card(Γ) ;Fψ
)
6 D ·D−
(
card(Γ) ;Fψ
)
.
Hence, it is enough to show that for every n ∈ N there exists Γ = Γ(n)
such that card(Γ) = n and
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖ 22 = n · ‖ψ‖22 . (4.4)
Indeed, if ψ has a compact support, say contained in [−2M , 2M ],
for some M ∈ N, then it is easy to find such Γ-s. For n ∈ N take
Γ = {2M+1, 2M+2, . . . , 2M+n}. Observe that
supp(T2M+j ψ) ∩ supp(T2M+` ψ) = ∅ ,
whenever `, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ` 6= j. Hence,
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖ 22 =
n∑
j=1
‖T2M+jψ‖ 22 = n · ‖ψ‖ 22 .
For arbitrary ψ ∈ L2(R), we can approximate ψ with functions of
compact support in an obvious way to get arbitrary close to (4.4),
which is enough to prove this theorem.
Q.E.D.
Remark 4.5. As we have seen in Ex. 2.16,
√
n is precisely “the order
of growth” in Riesz bases. If we consider our figure in Section 3, then
Fψ is democratic for every ψ ∈ a ∪ b. Hence, we know exactly what
happens within a ∪ b and we shall not explore these two subclasses any
further.

Obviously, we need much more operative criterium for the democracy
property of Fψ systems. This problem seems to be a difficult one. Let
us first take care of the easy part; the upper bound.
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Lemma 4.6. If Fψ is democratic, then there exists a constant 0 <
B′ < +∞ such that for every Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite, and for any sequence
{αk ∈ C : k ∈ Γ}, with |αk| 6 1, we have
‖
∑
k∈Γ
αkTkψ‖2 6 B′
√
card(Γ) .
Proof. It is standard to show that it is enough to prove the claim for
αk ∈ [−1, 1]. By Tm. 4.3 there exists 0 < D+ < +∞ such that
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖2 6 D+
√
card(Γ) .
For a given Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite, and a given choice of {αk : k ∈ Γ} ⊆ [−1, 1],
we define Γ+ := {k ∈ Γ: αk > 0}, Γ− := Γ \ Γ+, and
εk :=
{
+1 ; k ∈ Γ+
−1 ; k ∈ Γ− .
We, then, have
‖
∑
k∈Γ
αkTkψ‖2 6 max
εk=±1
‖
∑
k∈Γ
εkTkψ‖2 6
6 max
εk=±1
[
‖
∑
k∈Γ+
Tkψ‖2 + ‖
∑
k∈Γ−
Tkψ‖2
]
6
6 max
εk=±1
[
D+
√
card(Γ+) +D+
√
card(Γ−)
]
6
6 max
εk=±1
[
D+
√
2 ·
√
card(Γ+) + card(Γ−)
]
=
= D+
√
2 ·
√
card(Γ) .
Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.7. If Fψ is democratic, then there exists a constant 0 <
B′′ < +∞ such that
pψ(ξ) 6 B′′ , for a.e. ξ ∈ R .
Proof. Let us denote by DN the “symmetric” Dirichlet kernel, i.e.,
DN(ξ) :=
∑
|k|6N
e2πikξ , ξ ∈ R .
Then, for u ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] we obtain, using Lm. 4.6,
‖
∑
|k|6N
e2πikuTkψ‖ 22 6 (B′)2 · card{k ∈ Z : |k| 6 N} .
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Hence, there exists 0 < B′′ < +∞, independent of N , such that
(2N + 1) ·B′′ > ‖
∑
|k|6N
e2πikuTkψ‖ 22 =
=
1/2∫
−1/2
|
∑
|k|6N
e2πikue−2πikξ|2 pψ(ξ) dξ =
=
1/2∫
−1/2
|DN(u− ξ)|2 pψ(ξ) dξ .
Observe that ‖DN‖ 22 = 2N + 1 and that{ |DN(u− ξ)|2
‖DN‖ 22
}∞
N=1
is a summability kernel at u. Since we proved that for every u ∈
[−1/2, 1/2]
1/2∫
−1/2
|DN(u− ξ)|2
‖DN‖ 22
pψ(ξ) dξ 6 B′′ ,
we deduce that pψ(u) 6 B′′, for almost every u.
Q.E.D.
Remark 4.8. (a) Observe that a necessary condition given in Thm. 4.7
is also a sufficient one for the upper bound, since, by (4.2), pψ 6 B′′
a.e. implies
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖ 22 6 B′′
1/2∫
−1/2
|
∑
Γ
|2 = B′′ · card(Γ) .
Hence, it is the lower bound which creates the real problem.
(b) Considering Section 3, observe that Thm. 4.7 proves that if Fψ is
democratic, then Fψ is Besselian, i.e.,
ψ ∈ B ∪ 1 ∪ 2 ∪ a ∪ b .
Since (see Rm. 4.5) a∪ b consists of systems which are democratic, the
real question is what happens with
ψ ∈ B ∪ 1 ∪ 2 . (4.9)

Let us illustrate that the problem of the lower bound is closely con-
nected with the result of Wiener and Shapiro on concentration inequal-
ities (see [1] and [2], and references therein). The important role there
is played by functions with positive Fourier coefficients. In particular,
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such functions must be symmetric with respect to the origin. Let us
first make a calculation which is very similar to the original Wiener-
Shapiro method.
Consider a real-valued function ϕ ∈ L1(T) (for measure-theoretic
purposes we identify T with symmetric interval [−1/2, 1/2〉). If ϕ(ξ) =
ϕ(−ξ), for a.e. ξ, then ϕ̂(−k) = ϕ̂(k) ∈ R, for every k ∈ N. Hence, for
such a function we obtain, for every Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite,
1/2∫
−1/2
|
∑
Γ
|2ϕ(ξ) dξ =
∑
j,k∈Γ
1/2∫
−1/2
e2πi(k−j)ξϕ(ξ) dξ =
= ϕ̂(0) · card(Γ) +
∑
j,k∈Γ
j<k
2ϕ̂(k − j) .
(4.10)
Let us now symmetrize our periodization function, i.e., for 0 6= ψ ∈
L2(R) we define
sψ(ξ) :=
pψ(ξ) + pψ(−ξ)
2
, ξ ∈ R . (4.11)
Clearly, sψ ∈ L1(T), sψ is 1-periodic, sψ > 0, sψ(ξ) = sψ(−ξ), for every
ξ ∈ R, and
‖sψ‖1 := ‖sψ‖L1(T) = ‖pψ‖L1(T) = ‖ψ‖ 22 =
p̂ψ(0) = ŝψ(0) .
(4.12)
Furthermore, observe (see (4.2)) that
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ‖ 22 =
1/2∫
−1/2
|
∑
Γ
|2 sψ(ξ) dξ , (4.13)
and that
pψ is bounded above ⇔ sψ is bounded above . (4.14)
Using properties of sψ with (4.10) and (4.13), one directly obtains
the following result.
Proposition 4.15. Let 0 6= ψ ∈ L2(R) such that sψ is bounded above.
Then Fψ is democratic, i.e., there exists a constant 0 < D0 such that,
for every Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite,
∥∥∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ
‖ψ‖2
∥∥ 2
2
> D0 · card(Γ) ,
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if and only if
∑
j,k∈Γ
j<k
2
ŝψ(k − j)
ŝψ(0)
> (D0 − 1) card(Γ) . (4.16)
Obviously, in most cases one can not consider (4.16) as a “simple and
operative” condition, so we have to explore the lower bound further.
Let us first observe that the case D0 = 1 is somewhat simpler, more
accessible, and very much in the spirit of the Wiener-Shapiro result.
Theorem 4.17. Let 0 6= ψ ∈ L2(R). Then,
‖
∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ
‖ψ‖2
‖ 22 > card(Γ) ,
for every Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite, if and only if
ŝψ(n) > 0 , for every n ∈ N .
Proof. Since ψ 6= 0 and sψ > 0, we obtain ŝψ(0) > 0. Observe also
that ŝψ(−n) = ŝψ(n) ∈ R, for every n ∈ N. Hence, using (4.10) with
‖ψ‖ 22 = ŝψ(0) we obtain
∥∥∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ
‖ψ‖2
∥∥ 2
2
= card(Γ) +
∑
j,k∈Γ
j<k
2
ŝψ(k − j)
ŝψ(0)
.
Obviously then, if ŝψ(n) ≥ 0, for all n ∈ N, we obtain the desired lower
bound.
If, on the other hand, we have (see (4.13)),
∥∥∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ
‖ψ‖2
∥∥ 2
2
=
1
ŝψ(0)
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∑
Γ
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ > card(Γ) ,
then consider Γn = {0, n} to obtain
1
ŝψ(0)
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∑
Γn
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ = 2 + 2
ŝψ(n)
ŝψ(0)
> 2 = card(Γn) .
Hence, ŝψ(n) > 0, and this holds for all n ∈ N.
Q.E.D.
Even if sψ does not have positive Fourier coefficients, we can still
obtain democratic property. For example it is enough “to insert” a
function with positive Fourier coefficients between zero and sψ.
Corollary 4.18. Let 0 6= ψ ∈ L2(R) such that sψ is bounded above. If
there exists a function ϕ on T with the following properties:
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(i) 0 6 ϕ(ξ) 6 sψ(ξ), for a.e. ξ ;
(ii) ϕ̂(0) > 0 ;
(iii) ϕ̂(−n) = ϕ̂(n) > 0, for every n ∈ N ;
then Fψ is democratic.
Proof. By (i) we obtain
∥∥∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ
∥∥ 2
2
=
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∑
Γ
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ >
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∑
Γ
∣∣2ϕ(ξ) dξ ,
and then we apply (4.10). Since ϕ̂(k − j) > 0, for k 6= j, we obtain
∥∥∑
k∈Γ
Tkψ
∥∥ 2
2
> ϕ̂(0) · card(Γ) .
Since (ii) is valid, we obtain the democratic property.
Q.E.D.
Exactly as in the basic Wiener-Shapiro concentration inequality, one
can “insert” a function ϕ as above in any interval around zero. The
following result is well-known; we comment on its proof via (4.10) just
for our reader’s convenience.
Corollary 4.19. Let 0 < δ 6 1/2 and Γ ⊆ Z finite. Then
δ · card(Γ) 6
δ∫
−δ
∣∣∑
Γ
(ξ)
∣∣2 dξ 6 card(Γ) .
Proof. Consider a function
ϕδ(x) :=
(
1− |x|
δ
)
+
as a 1-periodic function. Observe that ϕ̂δ(−n) = ϕ̂δ(n) > 0, ϕ̂δ(0) = δ
and
card(Γ) =
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∑
Γ
∣∣2 dξ >
1/2∫
−1/2
1[−δ,δ](ξ)
∣∣∑
Γ
(ξ)
∣∣2 dξ >
>
1/2∫
−1/2
ϕδ(ξ)
∣∣∑
Γ
(ξ)
∣∣2 dξ .
Apply (4.10) to obtain the result.
Q.E.D.
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The following conditions are only sufficient, but they qualify as “sim-
ple and operative”.
Corollary 4.20. If there exist positive constants 0 < D0, D1 < +∞
and 0 < δ 6 1/2 such that
(i) sψ(ξ) 6 D1, for a.e. ξ ;
(ii) sψ(ξ) > D0, for a.e. ξ ∈ [−δ, δ] ;
then Fψ is democratic.
Proof. Directly from Cor. 4.19, since
D1 · card(Γ) >
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∑
Γ
∣∣2 sψ dξ >
δ∫
−δ
∣∣∑
Γ
∣∣2 sψ dξ >
> D0
δ∫
−δ
∣∣∑
Γ
∣∣2 dξ > D0 · δ · card(Γ) .
Q.E.D.
Let us turn our attention to necessary conditions. As we already
observed it is the lower bound that presents the problem and we need
to study the estimates of the form
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∑
Γ
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ > const. · card(Γ) .
Obviously, we are facing a large variety of sums |∑Γ |. However,
we can emphasize at least some significant ones. Since all functions
involved in |∑Γ | are unimodular, without loss of generality we can
always assume that
min(Γ) = 0 , (4.21)
and we shall do so in the following discussion.
One typical sum |∑Γ | occurs when there are “no gaps” between
terms, i.e., when
∑
Γ
(ξ) = D̃N(ξ) :=
N−1∑
k=0
e2πikξ ; (4.22)
the case of “one-sided” Dirichlet kernel.
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Theorem 4.23. Let 0 6= ψ ∈ L2(R) such that sψ is bounded above.
There exists 0 < C0 < +∞ such that
1/2∫
−1/2
|D̃N(ξ)|2 sψ(ξ) dξ > C0N , for any N ∈ N ,
if and only if
inf
0<ε<1/2
1
2ε
ε∫
−ε
sψ(ξ) dξ = C
′
0 > 0 . (4.24)
with C ′0 depending only on C0 and ‖sψ‖∞. In particular, condition
(4.24) is necessary for a system Fψ to be democratic.
Proof. Suppose first that (4.24) is valid. Then
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣D̃N(ξ)
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ >
1/2N∫
−1/2N
∣∣D̃N(ξ)
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ >
>
1/2N∫
−1/2N
∣∣D̃N( 12N )
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ > const. N2
1/2N∫
−1/2N
sψ(ξ) dξ =
= N
(
const.
1
2 1
2N
1/2N∫
−1/2N
sψ(ξ) dξ
)
> const. N .
Suppose now that there exists C0, a positive constant, such that, for
every N ∈ N,
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣D̃N(ξ)
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ > C0N .
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Since sψ is bounded above, we have ‖sψ‖∞ < +∞. For L,N ∈ N such
that N > 2L we have
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣D̃N(ξ)
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ =
∫
|ξ|6 L
N
∣∣D̃N(ξ)
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ+
+
∫
L
N
<|ξ|6 1
2
∣∣D̃N(ξ)
∣∣2sψ(ξ) dξ 6
∫
|ξ|6 L
N
N2sψ(ξ) dξ+
+ ‖sψ‖∞
∫
L
N
<|ξ|6 1
2
| sinπNξ|2
| sin πξ|2 dξ 6
6 N2
L/N∫
−L/N
sψ(ξ) dξ + ‖sψ‖∞
∫
|ξ|> L
N
1
4|ξ|2 dξ =
= N2
L/N∫
−L/N
sψ(ξ) dξ + ‖sψ‖∞
N
2L
.
Consider, in addition, L big enough so that L >
‖sψ‖∞
C0
. For such an
L we obtain
C0N 6 N2
L/N∫
−L/N
sψ(ξ) dξ + C0
N
2
,
which gives
0 <
1
L
· C0
4
6 N
2L
L/N∫
−L/N
sψ(ξ) dξ . (4.25)
We claim that (4.25) implies (4.24). Indeed, given 0 < ε < 1/2, we can
choose L,N ∈ N large enough with N > 2L so that
ε
2
<
L
N
< ε . (4.26)
Since sψ > 0, we obtain
1
2ε
ε∫
−ε
sψ dξ >
1
2ε
L/N∫
−L/N
sψ dξ =
1
2ε
· 2L
N
· N
2L
L/N∫
−L/N
sψ dξ >
> 1
ε
· L
N
·
(
1
L
· C0
4
)
> C0
8
· 1
L
> 0 .
(4.27)
Observe that in our construction we can first choose L large enough
and keep it fixed afterwards. On the other hand, N > 2L we can
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change freely to adjust for (4.26), with the original L kept in place.
Therefore, (4.27) proves (4.24).
Q.E.D.
Of course, one may hope that boundedness of sψ with (4.24) is also
sufficient for democracy. However, this is not so. We thank Professor
Aline Bonami for the following counter-example (it is also given in [2],
Remark 3). We shall briefly recall the example for reader’s convenience
and then comment on it.
Example 4.28. For ` = 2, 3, 4, . . . we define
E` :=
`−1⋃
j=1
〈j
`
− 1
2`3
,
j
`
+
1
2`3
〉 .
Observe that, for every L = 2, 3, . . . , AL :=
∞⋃
`=L
EL ⊆ 〈0, 1〉 and define
BL := 〈0, 1〉 \ AL. Take ψ such that ψ̂ = χBL. Hence, pψ is equal to
χBL on [0, 1〉. It can be shown that
lim
k→+∞
(
lim
N→+∞
1
N
∫
BL
∣∣D̃N(kξ)
∣∣2 dξ
)
= 0 ,
which shows that Fψ is not democratic. On the other hand ψ satisfies
(4.24) since, for ε > 0,
1
2ε
∣∣BL ∩ 〈−ε, ε〉
∣∣ > 1− 1
L
.

Remark 4.29. (a) Various subintervals within E` in Ex. 4.28 overlap
in a way somewhat difficult to follow. The density is actually 1, as one
can check carefully or adjust the example into its “dyadic version”, as
we do below.
(b) Condition (4.24) is the density type condition. One may feel that
positive density is not good enough, but that one need to require certain
level of density to reach the democratic property. Our adjusted example
will show that this is not so. Related to this observe that (4.24) may
achieve its infimum for ξ not close to zero, while we want “to mea-
sure” precisely density at zero. Hence, we shall consider (ψ 6= 0 and
‖sψ‖∞ < ∞)
∆ψ(0) := lim inf
ε↘ 0+
1
2ε
ε∫
−ε
sψ(ξ)
‖sψ‖∞
dξ .
The values of ∆ψ(0) and the infimum in (4.24) may differ. However,
(4.24) is valid if and only if ∆ψ(0) > 0. Furthermore, ∆ψ(0) ∈ [0, 1]
and, if ∆ψ(0) = 1, then the lim inf in the definition of ∆ψ(0) becomes
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the limit. As we shall see, we can have a maximal density ∆ψ(0) = 1
and Fψ may still not be democratic. In other words, “the density at
zero” type condition is closely related to sums
∑
Γ of the form D̃N(ξ),
where almost all mass is concentrated at zero.
(c) The sums that disprove democracy in Ex. 4.28 are of the form
D̃N(kξ). Observe that they have “k peaks” evenly spread with each
having roughly 1/k of the total mass.
(d) Observe that Ex. 4.28 provides ψ such that pψ is the characteristic
function of a set, i.e., Fψ forms a Parseval frame for 〈ψ〉. In other
words ψ ∈ 1; according to our Figure in Section 3.

Example 4.30. For k ∈ N we define
Ẽk :=
2k−1⋃
j=1
〈 j
2k
− 1
2 · 23k ,
j
2k
+
1
2 · 23k 〉 ,
and take Ã :=
∞⋃
k=1
Ẽk ⊆ 〈0, 1〉. Let B̃ := 〈0, 1〉 \ Ã and ψ ∈ L2(R) be
such that ψ̂ = χB̃. Hence, pψ is the periodization of χB̃ and, since B̃
is symmetric, pψ = sψ.
Since ∫
Ã
∣∣D̃N(2kξ)
∣∣2 dξ >
∫
Ẽk
∣∣D̃N(2kξ)
∣∣2 dξ =
=
2k−1∑
j=1
j
2k
+ 1
2·23k∫
j
2k
− 1
2·23k
∣∣D̃N(2kξ)
∣∣2 dξ = 1
2k
(2k − 1)
1
2·22k∫
− 1
2·22k
∣∣D̃N(ξ)
∣∣2 dξ ,
we obtain
1 > lim inf
N→∞
1
N
∫
Ã
|D̃N(2kξ)|2 dξ >
2k − 1
2k
,
which shows that
1 = lim
k→∞
(
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
∫
Ã
∣∣D̃N(2kξ)
∣∣2 dξ
)
.
Therefore,
lim
k→∞
(
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
∫
B̃
∣∣D̃N(2kξ)
∣∣2 dξ
)
= 0 ,
which shows that Fψ is not democratic.
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Observe that∣∣Ã ∩ 〈0, ε〉
∣∣
ε
6 1
ε
[ 1
2 · 23k◦ +
1
23(k◦+1)
+
2
23(k◦+2)
+
4
23(k◦+3)
+ · · ·
]
,
for some k◦ ∈ N large enough. Hence,
|Ã ∩ 〈0, ε〉|
ε
6 1
ε
( 1
2 · 23k◦ +
1
23(k◦+1)
1− 2
23
)
6 16
3
ε2 ,
since 1
2k◦+1 < ε 6
1
2k◦ . It follows that
1 > lim
ε→0
∣∣B̃ ∩ 〈−ε, ε〉
∣∣
2ε
> lim
ε→0
(
1− 16
3
ε2
)
= 1 ,
which shows ∆ψ(0) = 1; observe sψ 6 1.

As we have seen, Thm. 4.23 takes care of the sums of the form D̃N(ξ),
but it is not sufficient for the democratic property. We can use roughly
a fairly similar technique on sums of the form D̃N(kξ); we leave the
details of the proof as an exercise to our readers. Observe that (4.24)
and (4.32) are actually equivalent.
Proposition 4.31. If Fψ is democratic, then there exists 0 < C0 <∞
such that for every L ∈ N
inf
0<ε<1/2
1
2ε
∫
L−1⋃
j=0
〈 j
L
− ε
L
, j
L
+ ε
L
〉
sψ(ξ) dξ > C0 . (4.32)
Remark 4.33. Despite the fact that
∑
Γ can take many different forms;
not just D̃N(ξ) or D̃N(kξ), there are some hints to suggest that taking
care of these two type of sums may be sufficient for the democratic pro-
perty. Unfortunately, at this point we are not able neither to prove nor
to disprove this conjecture. Hence, the question of general and “usable”
necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy remains open. We
devote the rest of the paper to the analysis of some special subclasses
of functions.

If we have some additional analytic property of either pψ or sψ around
0, we may be able to obtain very elegant characterizations. Let us
illustrate this on a particular class and we leave other similar versions
as an exercise to our readers.
Let us define the following class
Lim :=
{
ψ ∈ L2(R) \ {0} : pψ(0±) := lim
ξ→0±
pψ(ξ) exist
}
.
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Corollary 4.34. If ψ ∈ Lim, then Fψ is democratic if and only if Fψ
is Besselian and
pψ(0−) + pψ(0+) > 0 . (4.35)
Proof. Let ψ ∈ Lim be such that Fψ is Besselian. If (4.35) is fulfilled,
then there exists δ > 0 such that sψ is bounded from below on [−δ, δ]
a.e. By Cor. 4.20 Fψ is democratic.
If pψ(0−) + pψ(0+) = 0, then pψ(0−) = pψ(0+) = 0 = lim
ξ→0
sψ(ξ) .
Then Fψ can not be democratic by Thm. 4.23. Q.E.D.
There is an obvious, but sometimes useful, special case.
Corollary 4.36. Let 0 6= ψ ∈ L2(R) be such that Fψ is Besselian
and sψ is continuous at zero. Then, Fψ is democratic if and only if
sψ(0) > 0.
Consider now our Figure from Section 3. We know that if Fψ is
democratic, then ψ ∈ 1 ∪ 2 ∪ a ∪ b ∪ B. Furthermore, if ψ ∈ a ∪ b,
then Fψ is democratic. We shall explore ψ ∈ 1 ∪ 2 first. Since then
pψ is bounded from below and above on {pψ > 0}, the analysis of the
democratic property depends only on the property of the set {pψ > 0}.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can consider the case of Parseval
frames, i.e., ψ ∈ 1. This is the case characterized by pψ = χ{pψ>0}. In
particular, these systems are always Besselian and the dual function
ψ̃ = ψ.
We introduce the following notion
D :=
{
A ⊆ [−1/2, 1/2] :
(
∃ψ ∈ L2(R)
)
(Fψ democratic ) pψ
∣∣
[−1/2,1/2] = χA
}
.
(4.37)
For A ⊆ [−1/2, 1/2] we denote [−1/2, 1/2] \ A by Ac. Observe that
every set A in D has to be measurable and that “A ∈ D” is really
the property of equivalence class (like with functions ψ ∈ L2(R)); if
A ∈ D and B ⊆ [−1/2, 1/2] is measurable and |A4B| = 0, then B ∈ D.
Furthermore, it is obvious that D has the hereditary property in the
sense
(
A ∈ D and A ⊆ B ⊆ [−1/2, 1/2] measurable ⇒ B ∈ D
)
. (4.38)
In particular, if A,B ∈ D, then A ∪ B ∈ D. The following results and
examples are easy consequences of our previous theorems.
Example 4.39. (a) If 0 ∈ Int(A), then A ∈ D and Ac /∈ D. Hence,
whenever there is δ > 0 such that 〈−δ, δ〉 ⊆ {pψ > 0} a.e. and ψ ∈ 1,
then Fψ is democratic. On the other hand, whenever there is δ > 0 such
that 〈−δ, δ〉 ⊆ {pψ = 0} a.e. and ψ ∈ 1, then Fψ is not democratic.
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Obviously, then, if 0 /∈ Cl(A), then A /∈ D and Ac ∈ D. The difficult
cases are when 0 ∈ Cl(A) \ Int(A) in “an essential way” (in the sense
that there are no B such that |A4 B| = 0 and either 0 ∈ Int(B) or
0 /∈ Cl(B)).
(b) If 0 ∈ Int(A ∪ −A), then A ∈ D. For example A = [−1/2, 0] ∈ D,
but also Ac = 〈0, 1/2] ∈ D. Therefore, the intersection of two sets in D
does not have to be in D.
As for an illustration let us emphasize that any set A which contains
a.e. any of the following sets must be in D:
[0, a] , 0 < a 6 1/2
[−b, 0] , 0 < b 6 1/2
( ⋃
n∈N
〈bn, an〉
)
∪
( ⋃
n∈N
〈−bn,−an+1〉
)
, 1/2 > a1 > b1 > a2 > b2 . . .↘ 0 .
On the other hand, even for very small δ > 0 and ε > 0, set [−1/2,−δ]∪
[ε, 1/2] is not in D.

Observe that the density results apply easily to this situation and
we obtain (
A ∈ D ⇒ lim inf
ε↘0
∣∣A ∩ 〈−ε, ε〉
∣∣
2ε
> 0
)
. (4.40)
Using (4.40) and Ex. 4.30 we obtain set A with the property A /∈ D
and Ac /∈ D. One can describe these various options using that, for
every Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite, we have
card(Γ) =
1/2∫
−1/2
|
∑
Γ
|2 dξ =
∫
A
|
∑
Γ
|2 dξ +
∫
Ac
|
∑
Γ
|2 dξ .
Hence, we obtain directly the following result.
Proposition 4.41. If A ⊆ [−1/2, 1/2] is measurable, then the following
are equivalent:
(a) A ∈ D ;
(b) inf
Γ
∫
A
|∑Γ |2 dξ
card(Γ)
> 0 ;
(c) sup
Γ
∫
Ac
|∑Γ |2 dξ
card(Γ)
< 1 .
It is also not difficult to see that(
A ∈ D ⇔ A ∪ (−A) ∈ D
)
. (4.42)
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Hence, resolving the democratic property for ψ ∈ 1 is equivalent to
answering the following question. Given a measurable, symmetric (i.e.,
−H = H) subset H ⊆ [−1/2, 1/2], what are necessary and sufficient
conditions on H to satisfy that here exists a constant 0 < C0 < +∞
such that
∫
H
∣∣∑
Γ
(ξ)
∣∣2 dξ > C0
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∑
Γ
(ξ)
∣∣2 dξ , (4.43)
for every Γ ⊆ Z, Γ finite.
Remark 4.44. Inequality (4.43) is the well-known concentration in-
equality for p = 2 (for a sample of rich literature on the subject see [1],
[2], and the references therein). The p-concentration problem has been
resolved in the case p = 2. However, our question remains open. There
is a different approach in (4.43); we fix a set and try to satisfy (4.43)
for all Γ (with a constant which does not depend on Γ). For the p-
concentration problem one usually seeks for some idempotent function
(in terms of convolutions) to satisfy the concentration inequality, i.e.,
the function may depend on the set.
We have seen several sufficient conditions and some necessary ones,
but not a complete answer.

Consider now the case ψ ∈ B. Roughly speaking the analysis of the
democratic property for a class xB, x = 3, 4, 5 , will be a combination
of conditions for class 1 and yB, y = c, d, e; respectively. Therefore, we
shall focus our attention to ψ ∈ cB ∪ dB ∪ eB.
Consider ψ ∈ cB first. This means that Fψ is a Schauder basis for
〈ψ〉, it is a conditional basis which satisfies property (H) and does not
satisfy property (B) (see [16] for terminology). The dual function ψ̃
generates the dual basis Fψ̃ which is not Besselian; in particular it is
never democratic. What about Fψ? Can it be democratic? Must it
be democratic? The following example is typical; at least for functions
with the limit at zero.
Example 4.45. Let 0 < α < 1 and let ψ be such that (pψ
∣∣
[− 1
2
, 1
2
]
)(ξ) =
|ξ|α; recall that pψ is 1-periodic. It is not difficult to check that pψ satis-
fies the Muckenhoupt A2 condition, which shows that Fψ is a Schauder
basis. Since pψ is bounded above, but is not bounded below (away from
zero), we have ψ ∈ cB (this is actually famous Babenko’s example).
If we take a ∈ 〈−1/2, 1/2〉 and define pψ,a(ξ) := pψ(ξ − a), it follows
that there exists ϕa ∈ L2(R) with the property pϕa = pψ,a (for a = 0,
ϕa = ψ) and that Fϕa ∈ cB. Since pψ,a is continuous at zero in all
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cases, but it is equal to zero only for a = 0, we obtain:
Fϕa is democratic for a 6= 0
Fψ is not democratic .
Observe a “catastrophic” behavior where we have democratic systems
for all small a 6= 0, but not for a = 0.

One can adjust numerous examples of the same type, by taking some
other continuous function to begin with; instead of |ξ|α. There are
many (even polynomial) examples which are going to satisfy the A2
condition. They are all going to exhibit the same property; if the value
at zero is not zero, then the system is democratic, otherwise it is not.
Completely analogous types of examples can be adjusted for classes dB
and eB. Therefore we can find democratic and non-democratic systems
in all these cases. Unfortunately, we were not able to improve on full
characterization of democracy in neither of these classes. It appears
that none of the conditions (3.3), (3.10) and (3.11), is particularly
related to the democratic property.
Let us complete this article with observations that in classes cB and
dB we have dual functions ψ̃, but systems Fψ̃ are not Besselian (hence
not democratic). Therefore we have the following result.
Corollary 4.46. Let 0 6= ψ ∈ L2(R) be such that Fψ is democratic. If
Fψ is a minimal system (in particular, if Fψ is a Schauder basis), then
Fψ̃ is democratic if and only if Fψ is a Riesz basis.
Observe that Fψ from Ex. 4.45 is an example of a conditional Scha-
uder basis where neither Fψ nor Fψ̃ are democratic.
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[1] A. Bonami, Sz. Gy. Révész “Failure of Wiener’s property for positive de-
finite periodic functions”, C. R. Math. Acad. Sci. Paris 346 (2008), no. 1-2,
39-44.
[2] A. Bonami, Sz. Gy. Révész “Integral concentration of idempotent trigono-
metric polynomials with gaps”, Amer. J. Math. 131 (2009), no.4, 1065-1108.
[3] Ch. Heil and A. Powell “Gabor Schauder bases and the Balian-Low theo-
rem”, J. Math. Phys. 47 (11) (2006), 113506, 21pp.
[4] E. Hernández, D. Labate, G. Weiss, E. N. Wilson “Oversampling quasi-
affine frames, and wave packets”, Appl. Comput. Harmon. Anal. 16 (2004),
no.2, 111-147.
[5] E. Hernández, H. Šikić, G. Weiss, E. N. Wilson ”Cyclic subspaces for
unitary representations of LCA groups; generalized Zak transform“, Colloq.
Math. 118 (2010), no.1, 313-332.
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noma de Madrid, 28049, Madrid, Spain.
e-mail address: eugenio.hernandez@uam.es
Morten Nielsen, Department of Mathematical Sciences, Aalborg Uni-
versity, Frederik Bajers Vej 7G, DK–9220, Aalborg East, Denmark.
e-mail address: mnielsen@math.aau.dk
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